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INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism that changes in government policy can produce los­
ers and winners. And nowhere is that truism more clearly revealed, or 
more closely studied, than in the context of tax rule changes. Consider 
the individual who makes an investment in real estate or business 
equipment or some sort of financial instrument (such as stocks or 
bonds) or even in human capital, and who does so in reliance on a 
special tax deduction or credit which applies to that investment. If the 
relied-upon tax preference is unexpectedly repealed, the investor may 
suffer what is sometimes called a "transition loss," a decline in the 
value of the pretransition investment. 
The story can just as easily go the other way: if an individual 
makes an investment before the enactment of the special deduction or 
credit (and oblivious to the possibility of its enactment), she may en­
joy a windfall "transition gain" when the new rule is unexpectedly 
adopted. And both effects-transition losses and gains-can result 
from any number of tax rule changes (including changes in the tax 
base as well as in tax rates) as well as from non-tax-law policy changes 
of every variety, ranging from developments in common law tort doc­
trine to changes in environmental laws or regulations to changes in 
government spending programs. 
That unexpected rule changes produce losers and winners is un­
controversial. Disagreement arises over the question of what, if any ­
thing, should be done about these transition effects. To put the ques­
tion slightly differently, what should our "transition policy" be? Or put 
differently still, to what extent should the government deliberately try 
to alleviate the "retroactive"1 effects of rule changes? 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful for comments re­
ceived from Steve Croley, Saul Levmore, and Daniel Shaviro. All remaining errors are my own. 
I The concept of retroactivity can be defined in many different ways, and the definition 
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However you put it, the question has spawned a substantial litera­
ture, which can be understood as having developed in three general 
phases (pp 2-3). Phase one was the "old view" scholarship, which re­
lied on general fairness concerns to argue against uncompensated ret­
roactive rule changes. In phase two, applying the assumptions and 
methods of modern economics (and the policy goal of social welfare 
maximization), "new view" scholars offered a decidedly more favor­
able take on retroactivity, and hence less favorable view of transition 
relief. Phase three marked something of a revival of the old view (or a 
reaction to the new view) in which scholars mounted welfarist (social­
welfare maximization) defenses of transition relief in certain contexts. 
In addition, and somewhat separately, a number of tax policy scholars 
have for years encouraged the use of retroactive taxation precisely be­
cause such taxes have the capacity to surprise investors and thus to 
raise revenue without distorting incentives. 
And now Professor Daniel Shaviro, building on the new view ap­
proach but adding his own distinctive spin, has written what will likely 
be considered the definitive study of legal transitions from the utili­
tarian or welfarist perspective,2 and perhaps from any perspective. In 
When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition 
Relief and Retroactivity, Shaviro takes the various strands of the ex­
isting literature on retioactivity and weaves them together, applying 
his unique combination of legal expertise, political pragmatism, and 
theoretical sophistication in public finance economics as well as politi­
cal science. The result is a subtle, balanced, and scholarly treatise on 
transition relief and retroactivity that should serve as the starting 
point for all future research in the field. 
In its stated objectives, the book is admirably ambitious. As 
Shaviro puts it in the introduction, 
This book seeks to reframe the scholarly transition debate, and 
possibly even influence political practice, through two distinct 
contributions. The first is to advance economic understanding of 
that a particular scholar has in mind can be crucial to his or her transition policy recommenda­
tion. For now, it is enough to understand that there are degrees of retroactivity; that is, a new rule 
can be applied more or less retroactively. See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 
22 J Legal Stud 265, 266-72 (1993). More precise definitions will be offered as the Review un­
folds. 
2 Shaviro explicitly adopts the "social welfare norm of utilitarianism, which seeks to 
maximize social welfare" (p 16). I will therefore use the term "welfarist" to describe Shaviro's 
approach to transition issues. For a precise account of Shaviro's normative assumptions, see pp 
16-19. For a comprehensive defense of social welfare maximization as the appropriate norm for 
evaluating public policy, see Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven, Principles of Fairness Versus Hu­
man Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and 
Business, Harvard Law School, Working Paper No 277 (Mar 2000), available online at 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> (visited May 12, 2000). 
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the transition issues posed by rule changes generally, albeit with 
particular reference to issues in the federal income tax. The sec­
ond is to integrate the economics with a political science analysis 
that is distinctive to the present federal income tax system, in or­
der to propose norms that should generally guide transition prac­
tice in this area (pp 1-2). 
Are these ambitious goals achieved? Remarkably, to a large ex­
tent they are. For example, Shaviro advances the "economic under­
standing" of transition issues in a number of different ways, perhaps 
most significantly in his sustained argument against the use of surprise 
retroactive taxation as a nondistortionary source of revenue and in his 
introduction of a new taxonomy of rule changes. 
However, it is with respect to the book's second stated objective 
("to integrate the economics with a political science analysis that is 
distinctive to the present federal income tax") (p 2) that Shaviro's 
most imaginative contributions come. For example, he develops and 
applies a public choice perspective to the tax transitions question, a 
perspective that includes a refreshingly realistic (if somewhat cynical) 
assessment of the tax lawmaking process. In addition, he makes bold 
and potentially controversial use of the "widespread consensus among 
tax policy thinkers" that the welfare-maximizing tax system is one that 
approaches the comprehensive tax base ("CTB") ideal by doing away 
with all (or almost all) tax preferences (p 93). 
Although Shaviro's framework is cleverly conceived and de­
fended, the "concrete policy payoff'' it generates is something of a dis­
appointment (p 14). After making a great show of the extent to which 
the new view transitions framework fails to incorporate the reality of 
political decisionmaking, Shaviro ends up adopting a version of the 
new view recommendations, albeit on different grounds (p 229). The 
reason for this anticlimactic conclusion, however, lies not with a lack 
of nuance or subtlety in Shaviro's analysis. It is difficult to imagine a 
more nuanced and subtle analysis. Rather, the reason lies in the nature 
of the transition problem, especially in the tax-legislative context, as 
well as a curious characteristic of public-choice-oriented normative 
tax policy scholarship. 
This Review will, in a broad sense, follow Shaviro's characteriza­
tion of the book's objectives. Part I will summarize the existing eco­
nomic framework for analyzing legal transitions and retroactivity is­
sues (with major emphasis on tax transitions). Although Shaviro 
makes numerous interesting contributions to this framework, this Re­
view will examine only the two most significant of these. That will be 
done in Part II. Then, Part III will focus on Shaviro's principal innova­
tion: his introduction of a thoroughgoing public choice perspective 
and CTB ideology to the tax transitions debate. 
1510 The University of Chicago Law Review 
I. THE EXISTING ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK3 
A. Choosing the Optimal Transition Policy 
[67:1507 
What is a "transition policy" anyway? The idea is to exert some 
influence over the decisions of political actors, to affect how they de­
cide to implement new rules. Shaviro provides the best articulation of 
this idea in his concept of a "constitutional norm." As Shaviro points 
out, a constitutional transition norm need not be, and usually is not, 
legally binding on the political decisionmakers in question-the ones 
who are making the policy changes to which the norm will apply. But a 
transition norm, to be effective, must at least be a "stable long-term 
rule or aspiration" that is somewhat "binding," at least in the sense of 
constraining or influencing the behavior of government actors (p 92).4 
Thus, in the legislative context, the transition policy would be the pre­
vailing norm, whether implicit or explicit, that tends to govern ("influ­
ence") legislators' decisions as to how transition losses and gains will 
be handled in the event of rule changes.5 
The next question is the one to which normative transition schol­
arship has largely been addressed: What should our transition norm 
be? And should it be different in different contexts? Before economic 
analysis was applied to that question, normative scholarship on the 
subject tended to focus on the "reasonable expectations" of investors 
and on the unfairness of making rule changes apply to those who had 
relied on prior law.6 Thus, the traditional view (again, sometimes called 
the old view) disapproved of retroactivity generally, especially in the 
legislative context. Economic analysis changed the terms of the discus­
sion and reversed the presumption, introducing a generally more fa­
vorable view of retroactivity and less favorable view of transition re­
lief. 
By far, the most comprehensive statement of the existing (pre­
Shaviro) economic framework for analyzing legal transitions can be 
3 Because of space constraints, this summary will be highly abridged. For a full review of 
the economic literature on transition issues, see Saul Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, 3 New Pa/­
grave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 340 (MacMillan 1998); Louis Kaplow, An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv L Rev 511 (1986); and the Shaviro book itself. 
4 It is in this sense that transition scholars often speak of a government's "binding com­
mitment" or "precommitment" to follow a particular transition policy. See, for example, Kyle D. 
Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommit­
ment, 94 Mich L Rev 1129, 1140, 1148, 1157 (1996). 
s One of the principal contributions of Shaviro's book is to summarize the existing tax 
transition norms that appear to be currently in effect with respect to certain types of tax law 
changes (pp 98-110) . 
. 6 See, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J Legal Stud 373, 391 (1977); 
Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 
Harv L Rev 692, 692-93 (1960). 
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found in a 1986 article by Louis Kaplow.' According to that frame­
work, the choice of an efficient transition policy turns, at least initially, 
on two general questions: Fxrst, what transition norm would optimally · 
allocate the risk of a change in government policy, that is, the risk of 
transition losses and transition gains? And, second, what transition 
norm would give investors the optimal incentives concerning whether 
and how much to rely on any government policy? 
B.  The New View: Focusing on Risk Incentives 
Standard economic analysis generally assumes that individual in­
vestors dislike risk, all else being equal. How do we know this? Inves­
tors regularly buy insurance policies or diversify their stock portfolios 
as ways of reducing the variance of outcomes that they face. Just as in­
vestors appear to want to shed themselves of such market-created 
risks, presumably they would like to do the same with government­
created risks, such as the risk of experiencing an unexpected transition 
loss or gain caused by a change in government policy. A number of 
scholars have observed this equivalence.8 And it is an observation that 
carries some weight, because it is also generally assumed that private 
investors should be responsible for finding their own ways to deal with 
market-created risks. Thus, if there is a general equivalence between 
market-created risk and government-created risk, the starting assump­
tion should be the same: private parties should be expected to find 
ways (through insurance policies or portfolio diversification or what­
ever) of dealing with the risk of uncompensated changes in govern­
ment policy that would accompany a retroactivity norm." 
But perhaps there is something different about transition risk. 
Perhaps there is some reason why, with respect to government-created 
risk, private markets working alone are not sufficient. The economic 
framework, primarily in Kaplow's article, looks at this question and · 
concludes that, in fact, the market-risk/government-risk equivalence 
generally holds. Specifically, part of Kaplow's analysis is devoted to 
working through a number of reasons why we generally expect private 
insurance mechanisms to be more effective than government­
provided insurance at dealing with the standard insurance inefficien-
7 See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 520-66 (cited in note 3). Although the Kaplow article 
provides the most comprehensive statement of the economic framework for analyzing legal tran­
sitions, the article does not reach definitive conclusions as to what the welfare-maximizing transi­
tion policy would be for any particular type of rule change. 
8 See id at 533-36; Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in In­
come Tax Revision, 126 U Pa L Rev 47, 65 (1977); Martin Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Re­
fonn, 6 J Pub Econ 77, 92-93 (1976). 
9 See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 513-14, 520, 527-36 (cited in note 3); Graetz, 126 U Pa L 
Rev at 65 (cited in note 8). 
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cies caused by the asymmetrical information between insurer and in­
sured; that is, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
And he explains why those problems are present with respect to tran­
sition risk as well, an assessment with which Shaviro appears to 
10 
agree. 
The implication of this analysis is that any risk-allocation defense 
of an anti-retroactivity norm- or a norm favoring transition relief­
can largely be ignored. Since we can count on investors to deal with 
transition risk on their own, our transition norm need not be con­
cerned with it. That conclusion seems to have gained considerable 
sway in the literature.
" 
Indeed, even Shaviro asserts that "the transi­
tion risk analysis often lacks significant policy implications" (p 42).12 
In addition to worrying about optimal risk allocation (at least 
long enough to dismiss it), the standard economic analysis of legal 
transitions is concerned with giving private parties the incentive to an­
ticipate rule changes. And this concern is not dismissed. The basic ar­
gument is straightforward: a transition policy that credibly promises 
not to alleviate the retroactivity effects of rule changes will encourage 
investors to take into account the possibility of such changes-even to 
anticipate them. And this will generally be a good thing, if we assume 
that government policy, over time, will tend toward the maximization 
of social welfare.
13 
Although the best example of the welfare-enhancing incentive ef­
fect of a retroactivity transition norm is that of a product ban (which, 
if made retroactive, gives manufacturers the incentive to pursue opti­
mal safety for pretransition as well as post-transition production), it is 
10 See Kap low, 99 Harv L Rev at 540-42 (cited in note 3). Shaviro seems to agree with this 
conclusion at p 42. 
11 For example, in none of his work on retroactivity does Saul Levmore discuss the risk­
allocation question. He focuses instead exclusively on the incentive dimension of the transition 
issue, which is discussed in the next section. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Repa­
rations, 99 Colum L Rev 1657, 1661-86 (1999); Levmore, Retroactive Taxation at 340 (cited in 
note 3); Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 279-91 (cited in note 1). Furthermore, I am aware of no ar­
ticle or book that explores the government-risk question, as Kaplow poses it, i� any level of de­
tail. Therefore, Shaviro's conclusion that the significance of the transition risk issue "has mainly 
been exaggerated" is puzzling (p 42). 
12 Both Kaplow and Shaviro, however, mention a possible exception to this dismissal of 
transition risk concerns. Specifically, they note that, in situations in which extremely low­
probability events are systematically underestimated by individuals, those individuals may tend 
to underinsure, with potentially drastic consequences if the event comes to pass. Kaplow, 99 Harv 
L Rev at 602-03 (cited in note 3); Shaviro (pp 33-42). 
13 Put differently, if we believe that good policy changes will in the long run outweigh bad 
ones, a rule that generally induces behavioral changes by investors in anticipation of rule changes 
will likewise enhance social welfare. This idea was first emphasized in a classic tax article by Mi­
chael Graetz and was later built into the larger economic framework by Kaplow. See Graetz, 126 
U Pa L Rev at 65-66 (cited in note 8); Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 533 n 65 (cited in note 3) 
(quoting Graetz). When Shaviro refers to this idea, he too calls it the "new view," and he cites 
Graetz as the originator (pp 43, 64, 101 ). 
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not the only one, not by a long shot. Indeed, part of what makes the 
incentives analysis so appealing, and controversial, is the strikingly 
broad range of rule changes to which it can be applied. Thus, the same 
welfare-enhancing incentive aspect of a retroactivity norm exists with 
respect to many types of rule changes, including, but not limited to: a 
judicial decision expanding (in an efficiency-enhancing way) tort li­
ability for product-caused accidents; the repeal of a special tax prefer­
ence provision that (for whatever reason) has proved to be a bad idea; 
or even the taking of private property for public use. In each of these 
cases, so long as one assumes that the government (including the leg­
islative, executive, and judicial branches) is generally moving in the 
right (welfare-enhancing) direction over time, the new view incentives 
analysis would apply.1• 
C. The Old View Revisited: Incentive Subsidies and 
Opportunistic Retroactivity 
It was to this basic new view economic framework (and explicitly 
conditioned on its assumptions) that I made a small contribution in an 
article published in 1996.15 In that article, I offered an efficiency-based 
justification for providing transition relief with respect to a specific 
category of rules. My argument was that, if there is an identifiable 
category of rules that the government uses as a means of inducing 
specific reliance by investors and that we want to preserve for the 
government's future use (a category of rules that I call "incentive sub­
sidies"), then adopting a transition policy that permits the imposition 
of transition losses upon repeal of such rules would come at a cost. 
The problem is this: investors, knowing of such a transition policy, 
would demand a larger subsidy than if the transition policy forbade 
retroactive repeal. I call this the "default-premium effect."16 Indeed, at 
the limit, if the retroactivity norm were sufficiently extreme-if the 
norm essentially said that whatever incentive subsidy the government 
provides will be opportunistically confiscated ex post (through nomi­
nal retroactivity or outright theft if necessary), then inducing reliance 
on the government's incentive subsidies would become impossible. 
Given my adoption of the new view assumption of a benevolent, 
long run, social-welfare-maximizing government, one might ask why 
the concern for government opportunism. Can a benevolent govern­
ment engage in theft? In fact, from a purely welfarist perspective, a 
14 As will be discussed more fully in Part III.A below, Shaviro observes that there may be 
categories of rule changes for which the desirability of this anticipatory incentive effect will not 
hold. 
15 See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1129 (cited in note 4). 
16 Id at 1140. 
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certain sort of government opportunism is entirely consistent with the 
benevolent-government assumption. According to the literature on 
the so-called "time-inconsistency" problem, developed by scholars 
within the rational-expectations school of macroeconomic theory, an 
otherwise social-welfare-maximizing government will behave oppor­
tunistically (will become a wealth expropriator) if (a) it cannot make 
binding promises not to do so, and (b) despite this fact, investors have 
no clue that the government would ever do such a dastardly thing." 
Under those assumptions, it can be shown that a policy plan of prom­
ising not to enact opportunistic expropriative retroactive rule changes, 
and then promptly turning around and doing just that, is in fact "op­
timal."13 
The lesson of rational-expectations theory, however, is that such a 
policy plan, though optimal if it were to succeed, cannot in fact possi­
bly succeed. Investors are not that stupid. They will anticipate such 
opportunism, perhaps even before they have been burned once but 
certainly afterward. And the government's bait-and-switch plan will 
break down over time. In fact, the certainty of its long run breakdown 
will feed back into the original decision by the government to adopt 
the plan in the first place. In other words, once rational expectations 
are taken into account, such an optimal plan is said to be "time­
inconsistent."19 A nonstarter. 
The default-premium effect that I have associated with the retro­
active repeal of incentive subsidies is analogous to this time­
inconsistency problem.20 Fearing expropriative retroactive repeal, in­
vestors will demand a default premium in their incentive subsidies, or 
may not be willing to rely on them at all. Thus, according to my analy­
sis, the welfare-maximizing transition norm with respect to incentive 
subsidies may be one that forbids (or at least discourages) the gov­
ernment from opportunistically expropriating previously provided in­
centive subsidies. That norm, in other words, may include an implicit 
precommitment (again, a constitutional norm) that the legislature will 
provide some minimal level of transition relief should a given class of 
incentive subsidies be repealed. 
Notice I said "may." Whether such a special transition norm for 
incentive subsidies would in fact be welfare enhancing depends on a 
17 The classic article on the subject is Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, Rules 
Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J Pol Econ 473, 474-75 (1977). 
Shaviro refers to this literature and the idea of opportunistic "rent extraction" briefly (p 89). 
18 That such an outcome could conceivably be called "optimal" is what drives some schol­
ars to doubt the welfarist approach. 
19 See, for example, Stanley Fischer, Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation and the Benevo­
lent Dissembling Government, 2 J Econ Dynamics & Control 93, 94, 98 {1980) (demonstrating the 
benefits of credible government precommitment to optimal tax policy plan). 
20 See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1143 n 54 (cited in note 4). 
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series of difficult conceptual and empirical questions. For starters, how 
does this old view goal of encouraging taxpayer reliance on certain 
government actions balance out against the new view goal of encour­
aging investors to anticipate rule changes? The answer may depend on 
our confidence in the initial decision to use the incentive subsidy in 
the first place and in our assessment of the likely need to use such in­
centive subsidies in the future.21 
Another objection that I have heard to my time-inconsistency/ 
default-premium argument runs as follows: when the government 
needs to make a binding commitment to induce specific acts of reli­
ance on the part of investors, it should do so through the use of a legal 
contract, and only through the use of a legal contract. Th.at is, after all, 
what government contracts are for: to allow the government to make 
binding promises about how much it will pay, to whom, and for what. 
Incentive subsidies, especially in the form of tax preferences, should 
never be used in that way. Rather, the argument goes, with any type of 
policy tool besides a government contract, no government commitment 
should be made as to whether payment will be forthcoming. To put the 
argument in quintessentially new view terms, with respect to such in­
centive subsidies, it is better to put investors on notice that such tax 
preferences, like any other law, can change in any way imaginable, in­
cluding nominally retroactively, and at any time so that investors ad­
just their expectations accordingly and take steps to anticipate 
changes. 
In response to this objection, I can only fall back on my own in­
tuition, since a definitive resolution of the issue must await empirical 
investigation. And my intuition is this: if we believe that the govern­
ment should be able to make somewhat binding precommitments with 
respect to its contractual arrangements,22 it is likely that the govern­
ment should also be able to make precommitments (albeit only im­
plicit ones and only binding in the sense in which Shaviro talks of the 
21 For example, as will be discussed more fully in Part ill.C below, Shaviro makes an argu­
ment that suggests that, for public choice reasons, we should adopt a transition policy that dis­
courages the use of all (or almost all) tax preferences (p 98). If one takes that argument seriously, 
the threat of opportunistic retroactive repeal of such provisions might be just the ticket. How far 
Shaviro wants to push the argument is unclear. 
22 How "binding" we want even government contracts to be is something of an open ques­
tion, for the same sort of public choice reasons that (as Shaviro emphasizes) we should be cau­
tious about "guaranteeing" tax preferences. For recent public choice oriented arguments that 
government contracts should be considered less binding on the government than private con­
tracts are on private parties, see, for example, Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: 
Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S Cal lnterdiscipl L J 467, 469 (1999); Daniel 
R Fischel and Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 Am L & Econ 
Rev 313, 327-32 (1999). Even these scholars, however, assume that government contracts will be 
binding to some extent. See Hadfield, 8 S Cal Interdiscipl L J at 469 (proposing to analyze, not if, 
but how the government is bound). 
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binding effects of "constitutional" norms) in some other settings in 
which specific investor reliance is needed but entering into individual 
contracts with investors is not practical. For example, it would pre­
sumably be extremely difficult to use a series of direct government 
contracts to replicate the type of broad-based reliance effect that a tax 
credit or tax deduction can induce-that is, reliance on the part of 
many investors in many parts of the country with relatively little in the 
way of red tape and other transaction costs.
23 
Thus, if government con­
tracts should be considered binding, perhaps incentive tax provisions 
should be treated similarly, as being accompanied by an implicit pre­
commitment to provide transition protection in the event of repeal.
24 
In some respects, Shaviro seems to agree with my default­
premium concern. For example, in his discussion of the transition-risk 
analysis, with a concept he calls "transaction flexibility," Shaviro cap­
tures the core of my precommitment idea (pp 37-40). He suggests 
that, where individually negotiated government contracts are imprac­
tical, the government might "offer the same rule in a variety of 'fla­
vors,' which differ only in the details of their transitional guarantees" 
(p 38).25 
D. When Surprising Investors Is the Whole Point 
The final element of the existing economic framework for ana­
lyzing legal transitions is the idea of the ex post capital levy. Among 
economists, it is sometimes argued that certain types of retroactive 
taxes are desirable precisely because they are a surprise to investors­
that is, precisely because they are not anticipated and have little or no 
effect on taxpayers' incentives.
26 
The argument derives from the opti­
mal-tax literature, which defines an optimal tax as one that produces 
the least possible distortion of taxpayer or investor decisions-specifi­
cally, the least possible effect on the labor-leisure tradeoff.
21 
According to the optimal-tax perspective, then, the best tax is one 
that the taxpayer can or will do nothing or very little to avoid. Such a 
tax is sometimes referred to as a lump-sum tax. The head tax would be 
23 See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 4). 
24 And let me be clear: I do not mean that contract law should be applied to tax prefer­
ences. Taxpayers should not be able to haul Congress into court for repealing an incentive sub­
sidy without providing transition relief. Rather, my argument is that there should be-and, as will 
be discussed in Part III.C below, there probably already is-a norm in Congress that constrains 
such retroactive repeal. 
25 There he was discussing the options of indexed versus unindexed government bonds, but 
later he notes that "this practice of offering the same rule in multiple 'flavors' could be extended 
to other contexts," including tax preferences (p 39). 
26 See, for example, Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 273-78 (cited in note 1). 
27 See James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 
Rev Econ Stud 175, 175-76 (1971). 
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one example: each individual taxpayer pays the same amount of tax. 
Period. The problem is that a head tax is regarded as distributively 
unjust. So are many other quasi-optimal taxes, such as excise taxes on 
inelastically demanded consumer products. In part for that reason, we 
have chosen at least at the federal level to rely primarily on income 
and wage taxes. But taxing income or wages means also introducing 
some distortion, as people can choose to earn less, substituting leisure 
for work. 
Enter the surprise retroactive tax. If the new tax is genuinely a 
surprise to taxpayers, then, by definition, they can do nothing to avoid 
it. And the bigger the surprise, the better. Plus, it is possible to make a 
retroactive tax somewhat progressive by making the tax base some­
thing that correlates with current income or wealth, say, past income 
or wealth. Thus, for one example, Saul Levmore notes the potential 
optimal-tax benefits of applying a tax rate increase or tax deduction 
repeal nominally retroactively, to tax years prior to the year of enact­
ment.28 
As was already discussed above in connection with the default­
premium effect, the problem with trying to surprise taxpayers with a 
retroactive tax, from an incentives perspective, is that taxpayers are 
not easily fooled that way.29 If there is a transition policy in effect that 
permits the adoption of nominally retroactive income tax rate in­
creases, or of ungrandfathered wealth-tax increases, such a policy will 
eventually be found out; the news will work its way down to the 
masses, leading to just the sort of anticipatory behavioral effects that 
optimal-tax theory tells us to avoid. Again, this is the lesson of the ra­
tional-expectations approach.30 
IT. SHAVIRO'S SPIN ON THE EXISTING ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
A. Taking Rational Expectations Seriously: Surprise Taxation Can 
Never Work 
One of Shaviro's most important contributions to the existing 
economic framework is his comprehensive and sustained attack on the 
optimal-tax justification for surprise retroactive taxes. In Shaviro's 
view, the findings of the rational-expectations literature, mentioned 
above, justify a somewhat extreme and potentially controversial con-
28 See Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 274 (cited in note 1). 
29 Levmore discusses this possibility. See id at 274, 276. One of his responses is that even a 
little surprise is better than none. See id. My retort was this: "True enough. However, having been 
hit once with a 'bolt from the blue,' and knowing that Congress will be tempted to try the same 
trick again, taxpayers will begin to watch the sky for the next one." Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1172 
n 140 (cited in note 4). 
30 See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1172 n 140 (cited in note 4) ("This is the quintessential ex­
ample of the time-consistency problem."). 
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clusion: that the use of surprise taxes can never have long-run effi­
ciency benefits. 
In developing this position, Shaviro points out that rational­
expectations theory does not claim that investors will never be sur­
prised by rule changes. Of course, they will. Rather, the claim is some­
what more modest: given that individuals will learn from experience, 
we should assume that they will not be fooled by a program of sur­
prise macroeconomic policy changes, at least not in a systematic way. 
That is, even if some investors are fooled, there is no obvious direction 
that the errors will tend to take. Some will underestimate the likeli­
hood of the policy change; others will overestimate it. In any event, the 
under- and overestimation errors will cancel each other out, thereby 
canceling out the lump-sum benefits of a long-term program of sur­
prise policy changes. 
From these seemingly modest premises, Shaviro concludes that 
the analysis of transition issues should proceed on the assumption that 
it is impossible ever to fool investors systematically in the long run.31 
Moreover, although Shaviro acknowledges the possibility that cogni­
tive biases on the part of individual investors (such as systematic un­
derestimation of retroactive policy changes) could in theory under­
mine his strong rational-expectations presumption (pp 22-25),32 he ul­
timately dismisses that possibility.33 
Thus, we are left with Shaviro's operating assumption: that a pro­
gram of surprise retroactive taxation cannot in the long run have op­
timal-tax benefits.34 But what about something short of a "program" of 
surprise taxes? What about the possibility of using this policy tool only 
31 "Rational expectations suggests that, if one is thinking about the Jong run, the incentive 
effects of retroactive rule changes can fruitfully be analyzed by ignoring their retroactivity and 
treating them instead as if they were preannounced or otherwise fully anticipated" (p 22). 
32 Where Shaviro reviews conclusions from the fields of cognitive psychology and behav­
ioral or "quasi-rational economics." 
33 Specifically, he argues that, until advocates of surprise retroactive taxation can offer em­
pirical evidence that there is a specific cognitive bias that systematically distorts investors' per­
ceptions of the likelihood of future retroactive taxes, we should assume that surprise retroactive 
taxation cannot be us�d successfully as a Jump sum tax (p 25). Of course, determining which side 
in a debate bears the burden of empirical proof will often determine the winner of the debate. In 
Shaviro's defense, however, he has offered something more. He has presented the conclusions of 
the rational-expectations literature, a literature, according to Shaviro, whose empirical findings 
strongly confirm its hypothesis: that investors cannot generally be fooled systematically by a 
program of surprise policy changes. Although Shaviro notes that the "full-fledged rational expec­
tations approach • . .  has not entirely carried the day" in the macroeconomics literature, he im­
plies that the remaining nonbelievers are merely suffering from an insufficiently Jong-run per­
spective (p 21). ("Rational expectations still holds over a longer term, however'' (p 21).) Whether 
he is right about that conclusion I do not know. 
- 34 This conclusion seems somewhat in tension with his willingness, elsewhere in the book, 
to entertain the possibility that individual investors may systematically underestimate the "risk" 
of uncompensated policy changes (p 40). 
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on rare, exceptional occasions-such as when we finally (once and for 
all) manage to shift from the current income-based tax to something 
closer to a consumption-based tax? Maybe that would be a good occa­
sion for a onetime-only wealth tax, a capital levy accompanied by a 
promise never to do anything like that again, at least not anytime 
soon. 
Shaviro heaps scorn on this idea, and perhaps rightly so. The 
problem with the "just this once" approach, of course, is that the gov­
ernment's very use of the retroactive tax may well undermine the 
credibility of the promise not to repeat the trick.35 To the contrary, it 
might have the perverse effect of alerting investors to the possibility 
of retroactive taxation, a possibility that many of them may never 
have considered before.36 Thus, in Shaviro's words: "Today's 'surprise 
party' may therefore prompt tomorrow's 'surprise non-party,' result­
ing in compensating errors in anticipation of retroactive change that 
prevent the government from using surprise to its advantage on bal­
ance" (p 22). 
He may be right about that as well. But then again, he may not. 
To the best of my knowledge, the precise findings of the rational­
expectations literature do not speak directly to the question at hand: 
that is, would it be possible for Congress, at the time it enacts a sur­
prise retroactive tax, to make a credible commitment not to do so 
again for a sufficiently long period of time that the incentive effect 
would be trivial? In fact, we do not have any empirical evidence, one 
way or the other, on that question. Given this situation of profound 
uncertainty, what should our conclusion be? 
If Shaviro's position on surprise taxation represents one extreme 
answer to that question, presumably the other extreme-the view that 
surprise taxes could be used effectively on a regular basis-has few 
adherents. An interesting question is what about the middle ground? 
That is, given the absence of empirical studies demonstrating specific 
cognitive biases on the part of investors with respect to retroactive 
taxes (and given that such studies may not be forthcoming anytime 
soon), should we consider an "only occasionally" or "just this once" 
retroactive tax strategy in the meantime? I, for one, find the possibility 
of a just-this-once retroactive tax somewhat attractive, although I ob­
viously see the dangers that such a strategy would entail.37 
35 See Logue,94 Mich L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 4). 
36 See id. "What's more, taxpayers may be less likely to believe Congress's commitment if 
it comes on the heels of the first surprise retroactive tax." Id. "Moreover, given the salience of 
the first retroactive tax, taxpayers may have a tendency to overestimate the chance of its reoc­
currence." Id at 1172 n 140. 
37 As I noted above, perhaps the just-this-once promise would be somewhat credible if the 
retroactive tax is enacted as part of a presumably onetime-only shift from an income tax to a 
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B. Developing the Policy Change/ Accounting Change Distinction 
The other major contribution that Shaviro makes to the existing 
transitions framework is the addition of a taxonomy for classifying 
rule changes. The most important aspect of this taxonomy -the one 
that he uses throughout the remainder of the book-is the distinction 
between the "policy content" and the "accounting content" of rules. 
According to Shaviro's taxonomy, every tax rule can be divided into 
its policy content (the efficiency and distributional aspect of the rule) 
and its accounting content (the details of the rule's implementation 
"that could in principle be changed without affecting its policy con­
tent") (pp 53-54). Shaviro uses these ideas to distinguish between 
"policy change" retroactivity and "accounting change" retroactivity. 
Policy change retroactivity arises in situations in which the antici­
patory (new view) incentive effects of retroactivity would be desirable 
if and only if the rule change itself is desirable.38 Thus, the merits of 
retroactivity in such cases depend on the "steady -state merits" of the 
new rule itself (p 48). By contrast, accounting change retroactivity 
arises in situations in which anticipatory incentive effects would be 
bad, and should be discouraged, even if the rule change itself is 
good-that is, regardless of the new rule's steady-state merits (p 50). 
To exemplify policy change retroactivity, Shaviro offers the stan­
dard product ban example. In addition, he mentions the example of 
the repeal of the tax exemption for municipal bond interest. In both 
cases, whether making the repeal retroactive (applicable to pretransi­
tion investments) will have beneficial incentive effects depends on the 
efficiency of the incentive effects that the new rules themselves are 
expected to have. Thus, if we think the product ban and the elimina­
tion of the bond exemption will improve incentives-that is, if we 
think the government has made social-welfare-increasing decisions by 
adopting those rules, then making those decisions retroactive will in­
duce efficient behavioral responses for pretransition investments as 
well. And if we think the rule changes are bad, retroactivity would 
likewise be bad (p 48). 
The starkest example of accounting change retroactivity is the 
hy pothetical shift from a tax-accounting y ear that is based on the cal­
endar y ear (ending, of course, on December 31) to one that is based 
on a fiscal y ear (ending on June 30). Absent some sort of deliberate 
transition relief, such as the introduction of a special onetime short ac-
consumption tax. 
38 And here we must again be careful in defining retroactivity. In general, when Shaviro 
uses the term retroactivity-such as with his idea of a "policy change retroactive tax"-he means 
something like nominal prospectivity without grandfathering. When he means nominal retroac­
tivity, which he thinks is and should be discouraged, he uses that term explicitly, and so will I. 
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counting year, some income may be taxed exactly twice in the transi­
tion year, and some may escape tax entirely (p 50).39 The reason this 
example is so powerful, and why Shaviro's ultimate conclusion that an 
antiretroactivity norm should apply to such cases, is that there is no 
apparent (or even conceivable) policy justification for such a random 
result. That is, one cannot easily imagine what beneficial anticipatory 
behavior a retroactivity norm could have in such a case. 
The utility of the policy change/accounting change distinction, 
however, will depend ultimately not on its application in the obvious 
case, such as the accounting rule change, but in the more difficult 
cases. To take perhaps the most important example in Shaviro's bo_ok, 
consider the accounting change and policy change aspects of propos­
als to shift from our current income tax to a more consumption-based 
tax regime (ch 9). Shaviro rightly, and skillfully, elucidates a number of 
ways that several leading consumption-tax proposals conflate an array 
of tax-rule changes that can usefully be disaggregated into various 
policy change aspects and accounting change aspects (pp 181-95). 
For example, Shaviro notes that the essential difference between 
an income tax and a consumption tax is the treatment of the "return 
to waiting." Thus, if we imagine two households with the same wage 
flows over time, "the income tax imposes a higher tax burden on the 
later than the sooner consumer, whereas the consumption tax imposes 
the same tax burden, in present value terms, on each" (p 171 ). Thus, 
the policy aspect of shifting from an income tax to a consumption tax 
would amount to a decision to exempt the return to waiting. In 
Shaviro's taxonomy, therefore, whether that particular change should 
be made retroactive (that is, whether retroactivity would have desir­
able anticipatory incentive effects) depends on the desirability of the 
consumption tax idea itself, the idea of exempting the return to wait­
ing. (For example, if we think that taxpayers are saving too little, and 
that a consumption tax will tend to encourage more savings, making 
the move to a consumption tax retroactive might induce desirable an­
ticipatory savings decisions.) 
Most major consumption tax proposals, however, also include a 
number of accounting changes as well, which are not clearly identified 
as such (p 184). Admirably picking on someone his own size, Shaviro 
cites as an example of this problem the scholarship of eminent public 
finance economists Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff, whose 
work in tax policy and tax-transition policy fields is, truly, "in many 
ways path breaking" (p 173). According to Shaviro, Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff define a consumption tax as "a wage tax plus a onetime 
39 As Shaviro acknowledges, this example is taken from Kaplow. See also Kaplow, 99 Harv 
L Rev at 613 (cited in note 3). 
1522 The University of Chicago Law Review (67:1507 
wealth tax upon its introduction" (p 173)."° Shaviro then rightly ob­
serves that this wealth tax really derives from an accounting change 
not a policy change, and he suggests further (again rightly) that under­
standing of the issues would be enhanced if such a wealth tax were not 
"built into" (or, made to seem an essential part of) the definition of a 
consumption tax. Thus, Shaviro suggests that the policy 
change/accounting change distinction, if nothing else, should be kept 
in mind for the sake of conceptual clarity and rigor." 
In addition, however, Shaviro wants to make a somewhat bolder 
use of his policy change/accounting change idea. He wants to argue 
that, just as retroactivity can produce only undesirable anticipatory 
behavior in the paradigm cases of accounting changes, making con­
sumption-tax-related accounting changes retroactive can likewise only 
be a bad idea. Ergo, the implication is that the onetime wealth tax in 
the Auerbach and Kotlikoff consumption tax proposal (and in many 
other such proposals) is a bad idea. In one sense, a onetime wealth tax 
(whenever it is imposed) has obvious similarities to the accounting­
year change mentioned above: taxpayers who happen to be wealthy at 
the time of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff transition get hammered; 
whereas, those whose wealth will be accumulated primarily after the 
transition enjoy a windfall gain. That distinction seems pretty arbi­
trary. 
In another sense, however, a onetime tax on all wealth existing at 
the time of the shift to a consumption tax looks somewhat less arbi­
trary than the failure to provide transition relief in the accounting­
year situation. That is, a onetime tax on wealth could conceivably be 
structured so as to be roughly consistent with our notions of distribu­
tive justice or progressivity.42 The same could not as easily be said 
about the tax that would be produced by a retroactive shift from an 
annual to a fiscal accounting year. Moreover, if taxpayers could be 
convinced that this tax truly is a onetime-only thing Gust as the dra­
matic shift from an income to a consumption tax could plausibly be 
sold as a onetime-only move), it might have the optimal-tax benefits 
discussed in Part I.D above. That possibility, of course, provides a 
plausible justification for Auerbach and Kotlikoffs approach of link-
40 Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dynamic Fiscal Policy 51-59 (Cambridge 
1987). 
41 The example of an accounting change wealth tax that Shaviro most often refers to as 
being "built into" consumption-tax proposals, and the one that gets the most attention in the lit­
erature, is the onetime elimination of basis ("the tax system's record of outlays that qualify for 
eventual cost recovery but have not yet been deducted") upon the adoption of the consumption 
tax (p 10). As Shaviro points out, a basis "wipeout" could be done entirely within the income tax 
system and without a shift to a consumption tax (pp 10, 184). 
42 Especially if accompanied by a shift to a more steeply progressive wage tax, to improve 
progressivity with respect to post-transition wealth accumulation. 
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ing the wealth tax to the shift to a consumption tax. As we have seen, 
however, these arguments do not fly with Shaviro. He just does not 
believe that such surprise retroactive taxes can work, even if "hidden" 
in the form of an ostensibly (though not actually) necessary element 
of a massive "one time" tax policy change.43 
III. SHAVIRO'S PRIMARY INNOVATIONS: INTRODUCING POLITICAL 
REALITY AND TAX POLICY EXPERT OPINION 
A. Attacking the Benevolent-Government Assumption 
Recall from Part LC the assumption, which underlies the new 
view incentives analysis, that the long run path of government deci­
sionmaking is upward, towards the overall improvement of social wel­
fare. Not that every rule change has to be for the better; there will be 
mistakes and corrections and even mistaken corrections. But the gen­
eral trend will be in the right direction. There will be progress. Thus, at 
its core, the new view is optimistic about the capacity of individuals, 
collectively through their government, to identify the common good 
and to achieve it."" 
Shaviro rains on this parade. Drawing on an influential branch of 
political science, he summarizes three "core defects of public political 
choice that discourage adopting optimistic new view assumptions 
about government decisions" (p 66). These defects, which he terms the 
problems of aggregation, organization, and information, are well 
known. The problem of aggregation includes various voting paradoxes 
(including Arrow's theorem and the cycling phenomenon) that call 
into question the possibility of aggregating individual preferences in a 
coherent way. The problem of organization includes interest group 
theory, which sees government as a means of transferring wealth from 
the disorganized many to the well organized few. And the problem of 
information simply recognizes that decisions tend to be worse when 
made in ignorance and that, for all sorts of reasons (including defects 
one and two), many public political decisions are made in ignorance 
(pp 67-73). Given these defects in the political decisionmaking pro-
43 Again, as I suggested above, Shaviro may be right about that conclusion, but whether he 
is depends on the merits of his anti-surprise-tax arguments (discussed in Part II.A), and not on 
the accounting change/policy change distinction. 
44 It is important to note that, although Kaplow, Graetz, and some of the other architects of 
the existing economic/welfarist framework have used the above-stated benevolent-government 
assumption in their analyses, those scholars are by no means unaware of the sort of political con­
cerns that Shaviro makes the focus of his book. For one example, in Kaplow's article, there is a 
long section on what he terms "institutional considerations," which include many of the public 
choice sort of concerns that Shaviro raises. See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 566-76 (cited in note 
3). In addition, Levmore's article on retroactive taxation is, at its core, a public choice take on the 
surprise-retroactive-tax question. Still, Shaviro's book represents the most thorough study to 
date of the implications of public choice theory for a wide variety of transition issues. 
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cess, "the mere fact of a policy change's adoption does not provide 
strong evidence of whether it [and therefore the incentive effect of 
making it retroactive] is good or bad" (p 73). 
What follows from this observation? What is its implication for 
the choice of a welfare-maximizing transitions policy? Shaviro admits 
that, in the abstract, the answer is unclear. It is only in particular appli­
cations that the "policy payoff'' will come (p 81). Most of Shaviro's 
book is devoted to working out the implications of these defects in the 
tax lawmaking context. 
B. The Reality of the Tax Lawmaking Process: Worse than Sausage 
If you think the legislative process in general is screwed up, wait 
until you get a load of the tax lawmaking process. It is especially ugly, 
says Shaviro. In support of this claim, he asserts that "[f]or decades, 
there has been a widespread consensus among those who closely fol­
low tax policy that the legislative process in this area is seriously 
flawed, even by the standards of collective political choice generally" 
(p 86). He then goes on to argue that the tax lawmaking process ex­
hibits the problems of organization and information (mentioned 
above) to a substantially greater degree than do other types of law­
making. Again, this assertion is supported by the widely held view that 
"tax politics tends to be dominated by interest groups that seek favors 
for themselves and that, through a norm of logrolling, almost never 
oppose favors for each other" (pp 86-87) (citations omitted). 
It is not that Shaviro claims that tax lawmaking is unique in hav­
ing these pathologies, only that it is one of several problem areas, one 
of the areas of "distributive" politics, that is plagued by "particularly 
destructive interest group influence" (p 87). Other examples of dis­
tributive politics that he mentions are tariff legislation and pork-barrel 
spending (id). Whether Shaviro is right that tax lawmaking is excep­
tional in this regard, or whether he is being unjustifiably tax-centric in 
his public choice critique of the legislative process, is a question that is 
beyond the scope of this Review. However, as will become clear below, 
Shaviro's tax-exceptionalism arguments are central to his reasoning 
and ultimately to his transition policy recommendations. 
C. The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Tax Preferences 
Shaviro believes that the exceptional flaws in the tax policymak­
ing process (that is, the chronic and severe problems of organization 
and information) have produced a divergence between the tax system 
that every tax policy expert worth his or her salt would recommend 
and the tax system we actually have. Again invoking "a \videspread 
consensus among tax policy thinkers," Shaviro urges that "society 
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would benefit from the use of a more comprehensive tax base 
("CTB") of either the income tax or consumption tax genre" (p 93).45 
He then explains why the choice between the two CTBs-income or 
consumption-turns out not to be a momentous decision (with every­
thing coming down to the question whether or not to have tax bur­
dens turn on a taxpayer's preference for current or future consump­
tion). Rather, the important tax policy question is whether to allow di­
vergences from whichever tax base is chosen, whether to allow the use 
of special tax preferences-credits, deductions, exclusions-that favor 
some same-period investments over others. And for died-in-the-wool 
CTBers such as Shaviro that question is a no brainer: the answer is a 
resounding no.46 Keep the tax laws clean of tax preference provisions, 
henceforth and forever. 
Here's the rub: the actual income tax code happens to be (and has 
always been) loaded with tax preferences. That fact is, unsurprisingly, a 
source of vexation for CTBers." Again, the problem from Shaviro's 
perspective is that any reasonably well-organized interest group can, 
with a little perseverance, persuade Congress to enact that group's pet 
tax subsidy. After all, those who stand to lose from the enactment of 
such tax preferences-that is, the taxpayers in general-are unorgan­
ized and therefore "little heard" (p 87). What's more (and this will be­
come important below), Shaviro argues that taxpayers, because of a 
manifestation of the endowment effect, do not seem to understand the 
equivalence of a dollar that the government spends directly and a 
dollar spent indirectly via tax revenues forgone because of some spe­
cial "tax expenditure" provision (pp 87-88). The result is that, al­
though the general good would be served by the adoption of a clean, 
comprehensive, tax-subsidy-free income or consumption tax (or, put 
differently, by the wholesale and permanent repeal of all existing tax 
preference provisions), we just never seem to get there. 
And here is where Shaviro's tax exceptionalism argument should 
be emphasized again: he does not contend that Congress should never 
intervene in the economy to encourage one type of investment over 
another. Indeed, he expressly rejects that conclusion. But he is clearly 
arguing that Congress should not, for the reasons just stated, intervene 
through the tax system to encourage one type of investment over an­
other. The conclusion of this reasoning presumably is that Shaviro 
45 Although he postpones "for another day" a full-fledged defense of the consensus view 
of the cm idea, Shaviro clearly agrees with it and expressly adopts it for the purpose of his tax 
transitions analysis (p 94). 
46 "Within the present income tax, the cm norm suggests that tax preferences and dis­
preferences that discriminate between alternative forms of same-period consumption or invest­
ment are generally undesirable" (p 98). 
47 One might even say a source of "sour grapes" (p 86). 
· 1s26 The University of Chicago Law Review [67:1507 
I 
should favor any transition policy or practice that makes any tax pref­
erence less attractive to taxpayers. As I will suggest below, however, 
Shaviro seems to pull back from this conclusion at the last minute, for 
· reasons about which I can only speculate. 
The next several steps in Shaviro's analysis are devilishly clever 
and exceptionally (almost exceedingly) subtle. In effect, Shaviro sets 
out to design a tax transition policy that will maximize the beneficial 
effects of shifts in the direction of the CTB norm and minimize the 
harmful effects of movements in the other direction ... In other words, 
he argues for a transition policy that will let the air out of tax prefer­
ences once and for all, even though (and, in some sense, especially be­
cause) Congress really likes using tax preferences. Therefore, in one 
sense, Shaviro wants to develop a constitutional tax transition norm 
that would ratify the current consensus among tax policy experts 
about what our tax code should look like, despite Congress's apparent 
disagreement with that consensus. Obviously, Shaviro has set no small 
task for hin:lself. 
He then starts out by making clear what his first-best tax transi­
tion policy would be. Recall that under Shaviro's framework, with re­
spect to the type of rule change that we are now discussing-a policy 
change as contrasted with an accounting change-the choice of the 
optimal transition norm depends on the desirability of the new rule it­
self.49 Thus, a decision that the CTB norm is the best steady-state tax 
policy has important implications, in theory, for the choice of an opti­
mal tax transitions policy. Specifically, Shaviro's analysis to this point 
· would suggest that the first-best constitutional tax transition norm 
would hold as follows: policy changes that represent movements in the 
direction of the CTB ideal (for example, any curtailment, including 
repeal, of a tax preference provision) will be made retroactive; 
whereas, any policy changes that move away from the CTB ideal (for 
· example, the enactment or expansion of such provisions) will not. In 
other words, transition relief should be provided in the latter cases, but 
not in the former (p 99).50 
As Shaviro concludes, however, such a transition policy would be 
politically unrealistic. Consider the general message that such a norm 
would send to lawmakers: if you (Congresspersons) decide to enact a 
good change in the tax law (say, repealing a pesky tax preference), 
please make that change retroactive. That is precisely the sort of 
48 In keeping with the subtlety and balance exhibited throughout the book, in the applica­
tions of this approach to specific cases, Shaviro notes that the CTB norm "does not provide the 
correct answer all the time" (p 132). 
49 See note 38 and accompanying text. 
50 Again, any accounting changes, in his view, should never be made retroactive, for the 
reasons already discussed in Part 11.B. 
I 
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change that we (CTBers) would like to see taxpayers trying to antici­
pate. But if you decide to enact a bad rule change (for example, if you 
enact, against our advice, yet another tax preference), well, make that 
change apply prospectively only, to minimize the harm done. 
Such a transition norm, Shaviro recognizes, would be neither sta­
ble nor binding. Indeed, it would be entirely self-defeating. It is almost 
impossible to imagine that the legislative majority that voted to ap­
prove a new tax subsidy would take kindly to the idea of intentionally 
blunting the effect of its new rule, merely because it is seen as a bad 
idea in the eyes of the tax policy cognoscenti (p 99)." 
D. Offsetting the Transition Gain/Loss Asymmetry 
By acknowledging that his idealized tax transition norm iS a non­
starter, however, Shaviro does not mean to abandon his hope of using 
tax transition policy to maximize the benefits of the CTB norm and 
minimize the harm caused by departures from it. It just means that he 
must take a more indirect route to achieving his goal. And here is the 
path he takes: first, he recognizes that he must either go with an old 
view approach (generally opposing retroactivity) or go with a new 
view approach (generally supporting retroactivity), even though he 
disagrees with key assumptions underlying both approaches. As a 
practical matter, he concludes, that is the best that can be done (pp 98-
110).52 
Therefore, the question becomes which approach-old view or 
new view-would do the most to further the CTB norm. And Shaviro 
answers that question by reference to an observation regarding what 
he sees as the existing tax transition norm, an observation that is as 
important to his eventual policy recommendations as is his embrace of 
the CTB norm itself: he argues that there is currently a bias in Con­
gress's tax transition constitutional norm in favor of compensating 
transition losers (if the losses result from the repeal of a tax prefer­
ence) and against taxing away or otherwise eliminating transition 
gains (if the gains result from the enactment of a tax preference) (pp 
88-91).SJ 
51 Kaplow, in justifying his benevolent-government assumption, noticed this peculiarity 
with the alternative of making transition policy turn on the steady-state merits of particular rule 
changes. See Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 566-76 (cited in note 3). 
52 See id. 
53 �haviro also discusses other types of tax rule changes, such as changes in marginal tax 
rates. Because rate changes are often used to alter the distributional consequences of the tax 
laws, the choice of a transition policy (effective dates and such) will turn on the same distribu­
tion-efficiency tradeoffs that motivate the rate change in the first place (p 120). See also Logue, 
94 Mich L Rev at 1170 (cited in note 4); Kaplow, 99 Harv L Rev at 519 (cited in note 3); Graetz, 
126 U Pa L Rev at 82-83 (cited in note 8). The same can be said of changes in the social security 
laws, the subject of Shaviro's chapter 10. 
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How do we know this is so? Shaviro offers both theoretical and 
empirical support. On the theory side, he argues that interest group 
theory would strongly suggest such a conclusion (p 89). The intuition, 
which seems entirely plausible, is that the political forces that would 
likely arise to oppose the imposition of a specific, identifiable transi­
tion loss would tend to be stronger than forces that would oppose the 
allowance of a transition gain.54 
On the empirical side, he offers two types of evidence. First, he 
notes that everyone who writes about transition issues, including the 
academics, tends to focus on transition "relief' for transition losses, 
even though he or she may acknowledge the gain/loss symmetry of 
transition issues.55 So there must be a bias. Second, and more impor­
tant, he looks at actual congressional practice and provides a couple of 
examples that support his gain/loss asymmetry hypothesis. For one, he 
observes that the so-called "binding contract" grandfather rule tends 
to be applied only when rule changes are made to the taxpayers' det­
riment (p 90).56 Thus, it is applied when depreciation deductions are 
curtailed, but not when they are expanded (id). And, of course, "rifle­
shot" transition rules-which apply to only one or a few taxpayers­
are always used only to prevent transition losses, never to take away 
transition gains. Shaviro concludes that, although these two "asym­
metric effective date rules represent a discrete practice of limited gen­
eral significance, they arguably bespeak an important broader atti­
tude" (id). 
Whether Shaviro is right about the "general significance" of these 
two examples, I don't know. But for purposes of this Review, I will as­
sume he is. Therefore, let us assume that, owing to flaws in the tax 
lawmaking process, the existing tax transition policy embodies a gen­
eral bias in favor of compensating transition losses and against taxing 
transition gains. So what? The answer lies in the CTB norm again. 
From the perspective of a card-carrying CTBer such as Shaviro, a 
norm that calls for compensating those who suffer transition losses 
when a tax preference is repealed but that also allows transition gains 
for those who anticipate new tax preferences cuts in exactly the wrong 
direction. That is, the anticipatory incentive effects of such a transition 
policy could not be worse. 
54 With tranisition losses, the costs are concentrated on a relatively small and identifiable 
group; whereas, with transition gains, the costs, in terms of lost productive efficiency, are spread 
over all taxpayers. 
55 See, even I did it. I mentioned the gain/loss symmetry in the introduction and then fo­
cused on transition losses throughout most of this Review. Shaviro must be onto something. 
56 This special grandfather rule holds that "property placed in service after a new provi­
sion's effective date will nonetheless be taxed under the provision that it replaced, so Jong as the 
taxpayer had a binding contract to construct or acquire the property by a specified date" (p 90). 
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Imagine the message that norm sends to taxpayers: Thinking 
about where to invest your resources? Wondering whether to rely on 
those enticing tax preferences, given the possibility of their repeal? 
Don't worry. Go ahead and rely on them. Even if they are repealed, 
your reliance interest will be protected by special transition rules, so 
long as you have a binding contract dated prior to the rule change. 
What's more, and get this, if you can somehow predict what new tax 
preferences Congress will cook up next, go ahead and invest there too, 
because (thanks to this wonderful asymmetry in the way tax law 
changes are implemented) the new tax preference will be applied ret­
roactively to your pretransition investment. You can't lose. 
This message, in effect, produces a transition subsidy for tax pref­
erences and against the CTB norm. Shaviro, therefore, wants to 
change the message, and he wants to do so by advocating a new tax 
transition norm, which he hopes will come to replace the existing, bi­
ased one. Given that his first-best transition norm is not politically 
practical, and given that the norm against taxation of transition gains 
is unlikely ever to change, Shaviro chooses the new view alternative 
(which encourages policy change retroactivity), although, again, not 
for new view reasons but for public choice reasons. 
E. A Problem for Public Choice Normative Scholarship 
What is especially strange about Shaviro's transition policy con­
clusion is how he expects to pitch his proposal to Congress. He recog­
nizes that the "real reason for advocating this norm-that in practice 
it may reduce Congress's predilection, through its transition policy, to 
favor tax preference expansion over curtailment-might lack broad 
appeal when stated forthrightly" (p 101). That is an understatement. 
Such a transition norm would have about as much chance of wooing 
legislators as would his first-best transition policy (that is, make your 
good laws retroactive, but not your bad ones). 
In response to this concern, Shaviro suggests the possibility of ar­
guing for the new view norm he proposes using a new view ("Graet­
zean") justification rather than his own ("Shaviroesque"?} defense. 
That is, he suggests arguing dishonestly, or least not "forthrightly," us­
ing terms that "are likely to sound more pleasantly in Congressional 
ears" (id). This suggestion, which I assume he means to be taken seri­
ously, puts in stark relief one of the difficulties presented by public­
choice-oriented normative scholarship: what is a public choice tax 
policy scholar to do, when the audience he is trying to influence, whom 
he is trying to get to adopt his recommendations, is composed of the 
same group of people that his own theories suggest are not collec­
tively capable of pursuing the public interest? The lesson of Shaviro's 
analysis seems to be that, first, you figure out what the right policy is 
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(taking everything into account, including public choice concerns) and 
then you find a non-public-choice argument (which you may not 
really believe) to sell your recommendation to the policymaker. As far 
as I am aware, this approach itseif is another innovation of Shaviro's 
book and perhaps the most important one, because it reveals the most 
extreme implications for scholars of normative public choice analysis, 
at least in the tax context. 
F. The Anti-Nominal-Retroactivity Norm 
In addition to concluding that transition relief should be provided 
for tax law "accounting changes" but not for tax law "policy changes," 
Shaviro seems to reach one other general conclusion regarding tax 
transition policy: that the existing constitutional norm discouraging 
"nominally retroactive" tax law changes should be retained.57 This 
conclusion is puzzling. Not because it is a bad idea; indeed, the anti­
nominal-retroactivity (''ANR") norm strikes me as eminently sensible, 
at least when applied to certain types of tax incentive provisions, such 
as investment credits (for example, the research and development 
credit). Were it not for an implicit, but strong, ANR norm, our invest­
ment credit provisions would have little effect.58 
What is puzzling is Shaviro's endorsement of the ANR norm, at 
least with respect to tax preferences. Given his apparent view that tax 
preferences are generally bad, I would have expected him to go out on 
a limb and favor nominally retroactive repeal of such provisions-the 
same way that he seems to endorse nominal retroactivity with respect 
to new product bans or the efficient expansion of tort liability doc­
trine. But for reasons that remain a little mysterious, he pulls back 
from that conclusion. 
At first, I thought the mystery was solved by Shaviro's statement 
that there was a well entrenched anti-nominal-retroactivity norm that 
simply had to be acknowledged and recognized as a "brute fact" of 
political life (p 109). That conclusion suggested no endorsement of the 
norm, just a begrudging acceptance of it. But then Shaviro goes on to 
offer a justification of the ANR norm, offering a rationale that is es­
pecially interesting: he defends the ANR norm as a means of limiting 
the potential reach of government opportunism and of enabling 
"Congress to be able to make credible binding commitments (and not 
57 Again, the precise definition of the term "nominally retroactive" is hard to pin down. 
One plausible definition in the tax context is the application of a tax rule change to a prior year's 
tax return (or to income earned or expenses incurred prior to the rule change). 
58 When it comes to nominally retroactive tax rate increases, however, I am inclined toward 
Levmore's position, which seems more open to the occasional use of retroactive rate increases 
on optimal-tax normative grounds, but which acknowledges the public choice impediments to 
such an approach. See Levmore, 22 J Legal Stud at 265 (cited in note 1 ). 
2000] Pub lic Choice and Tax Transition D eb ate 1531 
just by the cumbersome practice of executing contracts)" (id). Thus, 
Shaviro harkens back to his discussion of "transactional flexibility" 
and "flavors" of rules, discussed in Part LC above, apparently adopting 
a position that is consistent with my anti-opportunism arguments 
against unfettered retroactivity. 
How does all of this fit together? On one hand, Shaviro seems to 
oppose the use of tax preferences, of any sort, ever. That sentiment 
motivates his endorsement of the CTB norm and, ultimately, his new 
view approach to transition losses. On the other hand, he favors the 
existing ANR norm, which provides some transition protection to 
those who invest in reliance on tax preferences. Perhaps the best way 
to reconcile these positions is simply to say that Shaviro is splitting the 
difference between two competing concerns. Although his main goal is 
to discourage the use of tax preferences, because of the public choice 
problem of the few exploiting the many, he also wants to make some 
concession to the opposite concern, the problem of the many exploit­
ing the few. And the ANR norm balances those concerns, in an admit­
tedly imprecise but arguably tolerable way (pp 108-10). 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude with a few words on the "widespread consensus 
among tax policy thinkers" (p 93) in favor of the CTB norm and 
against the use of tax preferences, since, as Shaviro's book makes 
clear, one's views on that consensus are important to the choice of an 
optimal tax transition policy. Much has been written on the CTB norm 
over the years, as staunch CTBers have called into question the use of 
"tax expenditures"59 and anti-CTBers have questioned the coherence 
and validity of the CTB ideal.Ill In my view, although the anti-CTBers 
have had the better of the debate, the public choice concerns that 
Shaviro raises give me pause. That is, if we can overcome the concep­
tual difficulty of distinguishing between tax "preferences," on the one 
hand, and "structural" elements of the tax base, on the other (which is 
the difficulty rightly emphasized by anti-CTBers), Shaviro's worry 
about interest group influence seems valid. 
My primary concern, however, with the CTB norm as articulated 
by Shaviro and incorporated into his transition recommendations is 
"59 For a general discussion, see Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied 
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 
Harv L Rev 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern· 
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv L Rev 705 (1970). 
60 See Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 
54 Tax Notes 1661, 1661 (1992); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the 
National Budget, 22 Natl Tax J 244, 247 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a 
Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv L Rev 925, 934 (1967). 
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the tax-exceptionalism problem. 1bis Review is not the place to pur­
sue the issue at length, but I suspect that the public choice critique of 
tax preferences would apply with equal strength to any other type of 
governmental preference. Although Shaviro acknowledges that there 
are other areas of "distributional politics" besides the tax area, he 
does not seem to recognize that whenever Congress seeks to encour­
age investments of one type over another, whether through the tax 
laws or through direct expenditures, all the same interest group con­
cerns arise. 
His response is that tax preferences are structurally distinct from 
direct expenditures in certain respects. The most important one, in 
Shaviro's analysis, is the role of the endowment effect. As suggested 
above, in Shaviro's view, there is a heuristic bias that "induces people 
to draw an exaggerated distinction between money that is never paid 
in to the 'Ireasury and money that is first paid in and then taken back 
out" (p 87). And that bias gives tax preferences "greater political ap­
peal" than would the same subsidy in the form of a direct expenditure 
(id). 
But even if that is so, the normative implication is unclear. For 
example, if policy experts were to conclude on substantive grounds 
that a given subsidy-a given preference for one kind of investment 
over another-would be welfare enhancing, perhaps structuring the 
proposal in the form of a tax preference (rather than as a direct ex­
penditure) would be desirable, precisely because of the endowment 
effect, precisely because it would minimize taxpayer opposition and 
maximize the odds of getting the change adopted. 
Granted, such use of a cognitive psychology/public choice argu­
ment is cynical. But that is the nature of such arguments, and I did not 
start it. Moreover, at least in this case, the policy experts could be 
forthright with policymakers (if not with taxpayers) about the reason 
for choosing the tax code as the location for the preference. Of course, 
if the word got back to taxpayers that a trick was being played on 
them, the endowment effect might be lost. But if the tax-preference 
endowment effect were so easily eliminated, then Shaviro's objection 
to tax preferences in the first place would lose a great deal of its force. 
In that case, we could simply start by explaining to taxpayers the 
equivalence of tax expenditures and direct expenditures and be done 
with it. 
Does my anti-tax-exceptionalism argument imply that we should 
reject the CTB norm and Shaviro's public choice concerns about tax 
preferences? Of course not. Those concerns are valid. They provide 
ample reason to be skeptical of any tax preference (putting aside for 
now the difficulty of defining a tax preference). My point, however, is 
that such concerns also provide ample reason to be skeptical of any 
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governmental preferences, which means the public choice problem 
could be a much larger one than Shaviro's tax exceptionalism sug­
gests. 
Having said all of this, I, for one, am not yet sufficiently skeptical 
of the legislative lawmaking process to endorse a transition policy that 
would undermine lawmakers' ability ever to use tax (or, taken to the 
extreme, nontax) preferences in the future.61 And, apparently, neither 
is Shaviro. Indeed, his bottom line transition proposal for tax prefer­
ences-including (critically) his endorsement of the ANR norm as 
applied to tax-preference repeals-strikes me as a sensible middle po­
sition. Under such a rule, although many types of tax preferences 
would be discouraged (because of the default-premium effect dis­
cussed in Part LC above), if Congress nevertheless determines that a 
tax preference is called for, the use of various "up front" tax subsidies 
would continue to provide a default-premium-minimizing option for 
lawmakers.62 
Of course, from the perspective of the radical CTBer, the worry 
would be that, under Shaviro's proposal, the availability of transition­
protected up front tax subsidies is just another loophole that needs to 
be slammed shut. Fortunately, from the anti-opportunism perspective, 
the ANR norm appears to be safe, for now. 
61 Part of my unwillingness to eliminate tax and nontax preferences from lawmakers' pol­
icy toolbox is that I still tend to hold a somewhat optimistic view of policymaking in the long run. 
For a similar sentiment, with respect to lawmaking generally, see Levmore, 99 Colum L Rev at 
1662 (cited in note 11) ("In short, although there is an endless stream of pessimistic arguments 
about the likely character of laws, there may be a comparable-less f amiliar but perhaps supe­
rior-set of optimistic arguments supporting the idea that most new law is good law."). 
62 "Up front" subsidies include credits or deductions all or most of whose benefits are con­
centrated in the first year of investment and thus for which an ANR norm provides almost full 
transition-loss protection. See Logue, 94 Mich L Rev at 1192-94 (cited in note 4); Kaplow, 99 
Harv L Rev at 587 (cited in note 3). See also Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: Onetime vs. Peri­
odic: An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 Tax L Rev 305, 309-12 (1994). 

